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Resumo
Afeganistão: Transição e Parceria
Os pontos de viragem raramente são aparentes 
à época, por mais inevitáveis que eles possam 
parecer aos historiadores. Desconhece ‑se se o 
ponto de viragem no Afeganistão já passou, mas 
o progresso efectuado em 2010 e 2011 deu ‑nos a 
oportunidade de persistir neste esforço e levá ‑lo 
a bom termo. Ainda que exista um longo e árduo 
caminho a percorrer, se continuarmos determi‑
nados esse caminho conduzirá a um Afeganistão 
mais estável e a um mundo mais seguro objecti‑
vos pelos quais muitos sacrificaram tanto.
Abstract
Turning points are rarely apparent at the time, 
however inevitable they seem to historians. It is 
unknown whether the turning point in Afghanistan 
has passed, but the progress made in 2010 into 2011 
has provided the opportunity to see this effort through 
to a successful conclusion. While there will still be 
a long hard road ahead, by remaining resolute, that 
road will lead to the stable Afghanistan and safer 
world for which so many have sacrificed so much.
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Regaining the Initiative
2009 was a tough year. Security, which we had seen worsen over several years, 
continued to deteriorate. The insurgents gained momentum, deepened their grip 
in the south and east and spread into the north and west. They regenerated during 
the winter months in their sanctuaries in the lawless border areas of Pakistan. 
Governance had stalled. The controversial 2009 presidential election was internally 
divisive and damaged trust between the international community and the Afghan 
political leadership.
The commander of the international Security Assistance Force (iSAF) at the 
time, General Stanley Mcchrystal, described the situation in his major review as 
“serious and deteriorating” and warned of campaign failure. Public support across 
the Alliance was eroding fast. despite a doubling of US forces, President Obama’s 
West Point speech in december 2009 was widely interpreted as signaling for the 
exit, beginning in the summer of 2011. Several Alliance leaders were pressing pu-
blicly for reconciliation with moderate Taliban as an alternative to – rather than a 
component of – a successful campaign. it was clear that 2010 was not only going 
to be a pivotal year, but the last opportunity to re -boot the campaign. 
Security
The effort to regain the initiative started in central Helmand in March 2010, 
when the military surge was just beginning. Operation Moshterak or “Together” 
in dari – the first truly partnered major offensive – led to the genuinely iconic 
moment of liberating the derelict town of Marjah. Taliban control of this town was 
so complete that their flag was flying over the district centre. The people were 
traumatized, not so much by the repressive but orderly Taliban, but rather by years 
of suffering under a brutal and predatory police force led by local tribal warlords, 
who ran the drugs trade and could buy influence in Kabul. At a shura meeting with 
President Karzai a few weeks after the initial clearing operation, the people warned 
that they would take up arms and invite the Taliban back if that police force retur-
ned. it was a pivotal moment. As President Karzai said afterwards, in areas like 
Marjah, people preferred the Taliban to his government and regarded him as a 
puppet: a point he was to repeat publicly and which has affected his political ou-
tlook since.
By March 2011, Marjah had been transformed: a bustling market, a proper road, 
street lights, schools and clinics opening, wheat rather than poppy in the fields, a 
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newly elected district council and a locally recruited police force within the formal 
institution of the Afghan security forces. People in the market explained that, whi-
le they appreciated schools, clinics and roads, their allegiance was determined by 
the core functions of the state: security and the rule of law provided by accounta-
ble institutions; this is a crucial lesson.
When General david Petraeus took over as cOMiSAF in the summer of 2011, 
the campaign moved to Kandahar. The insurgents were cleared from the key districts 
to the west of the city – the birthplace of Mullah Omar and thus the cradle of the 
Taliban. Kandahar is critical: as most Afghans will tell you, if you hold Kandahar 
and Kabul, you hold Afghanistan. Kabul was calm throughout 2010, primarily 
because of the intense tempo of intelligence -led and partnered Special Forces ope-
rations against the networks which target the capital: notably the Haqqanis from 
their base in north Waziristan. elsewhere, the insurgency’s momentum was halted.
For the first time, Afghan security forces outnumbered international forces in 
the Kandahar operations. They truly led much of the fighting, for which the nATO 
Training Mission Afghanistan (nTM -A) deserves real credit. in nTM -A’s first year, 
the Afghan security forces exceeded their growth targets. Additionally, nTM -A 
implemented new programmes to raise quality and institutional capability and 
sharply improved training effectiveness.
However, progress was not just due to bigger and better Afghan and interna-
tional forces. in Gizab district, on the borders of daykundi and Uruzgan provinces, 
the locals expelled the Taliban and kept them out with help from the village stabi-
lity teams run by US Special Forces – small groups of soldiers who live and ope-
rate among the people. This was perhaps the best example of one of the most 
important innovations of 2010: the Afghan Local Police, or ALP. For the same rea-
son that it took months of effort to gain the people’s confidence in Marjah, in the 
contested rural areas, Afghans want to be secured by locals and policed by outsiders. 
And initiatives like this pass the most important test: they are Afghan -authentic. 
As Lawrence of Arabia said a century ago: “it is their country, their way and our 
time is short”.
This impressive progress came at a high cost. 2010 was the bloodiest year for 
the Alliance and for Afghan civilians. Several thousand Afghan civilians were kil-
led, most by the indiscriminate violence of improvised explosive devices (ieds) 
laid by the insurgents. Roadside bombs particularly threatened children. For its 
part, iSAF stepped up its efforts to avoid iSAF -caused civilian casualties. For iSAF, 
one civilian casualty is one too many. despite doubling the number of forces and 
the operational tempo, the United nations recorded that iSAF had reduced iSAF-
-caused civilian casualties by a quarter. The effort continues.
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Governance and Development
Although inevitably the focus is on security, most Afghans are also preoccupied 
with poverty. infant mortality is staggering: one in five children die before their 
fifth birthday, not through violence, but because of bad water and bad air. diarrhe-
al diseases are responsible for almost a third of Afghan infant deaths and respira-
tory diseases for over a quarter. despite dramatic improvements in access to heal-
thcare and education, Afghanistan is unfortunately likely to remain a poor and 
underdeveloped country for many years to come. However, if in 2015, the interna-
tional community is talking not about violence, security and troop numbers, but 
about poverty, healthcare and development, then it will finally be talking about the 
issues which affect most Afghans the majority of the time.
Governance remains just as challenging. Afghanistan is lodged at the bottom of 
the Transparency international corruption perceptions index; civil service capabili-
ty is weak, the rule of law is absent or predatory in many areas, many district posts 
are vacant and half the district governors lack offices, transport, facilities or staff. 
There have been improvements, however: several of the key ministers have made 
progress against corruption and in building administrative capacity. notably, clea-
ning up the notorious customs service has also strengthened government revenues.
President Karzai has dissolved private security companies associated with 
members of the government or their families. Raising police salaries above subsis-
tence levels has helped combat corruption. The economic highlight of 2010 was the 
unearthing of Afghanistan’s extraordinary and diverse mineral wealth. While the 
opportunities are obvious, the risks mustn’t be ignored: without effective efforts to 
forestall corruption, this too could become a source of conflict. Fortunately, one of 
the most effective ministers is in charge of this portfolio. 
Arguably, 2010’s worst moment was the Kabul Bank crisis which brought the 
Afghan financial system to the brink of collapse. Afghanistan’s largest bank hand-
les the salaries of most Afghan public servants, including the security forces. in 
effect, the bank had been turned into a pyramid scheme at the expense of the 
millions of small depositors who had entrusted it with their savings. 
The international Monetary Fund has demanded a credible plan to recover 
assets and restructure the bank in order to approve the next iMF programme, whi-
ch itself is necessary for other multilateral and bilateral donors to continue funding 
the Afghan government. This is vital to maintain progress in the counterinsurgency 
campaign and transition, and to have any prospect of reaching the London and 
Kabul conference targets for delivering 50 percent of foreign aid through Afghan 
government systems and aligning 80 percent of it with their priority programmes.
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exerting sovereign authority is central to President Karzai’s political agenda. 
On occasion, his outbursts of frustration with the international community, coupled 
with nationalistic comments, have caused international publics to question the 
sacrifices for a seemingly unwilling partner.
While many diplomats prefer disagreements to be handled in private, everyone 
has their own politics. As one senior Afghan official said, any close but somewhat 
adolescent relationship involves shouting.
The partnership survives these ups and downs because of a common strategic 
goal: an Afghanistan which can secure and govern itself. The main diplomatic 
focus in 2010 was to work towards achieving that goal through transition and 
partnership. At the Lisbon Summit, the Alliance agreed to transition the lead 
responsibility for security country -wide to the Afghans by the end of 2014. in 
March 2010, to mark the Afghan new Year, in a speech to the national Military 
Academy’s graduation ceremony (Afghanistan’s West Point), President Karzai 
announced the first seven areas which will start the transition process. These 
areas cover 20 -25 per cent of the population and all four points of the compass, 
reflecting the regional and ethnic balance of Afghanistan. Transition has been 
designed to be an irreversible, conditions -based process, through which respon-
sibility is gradually handed to the Afghan security forces as their capabilities 
grow, underpinned by adequate Afghan -led development and governance, nota-
bly (remember Marjah) the rule of law.
For several years, governance had flat -lined because the incentives weren’t right. 
For years, in the absence of Afghan capability, the international community delive-
red public services through a variety of what President Karzai describes as “paral-
lel structures”. This created an unhealthy dependency trap and what some analysts 
describe as the “rentier state”, where Afghan governance focuses on deploying 
patronage.
Transition shifts the incentives as Afghan civil governance gets off the “welfare” 
of letting the international community deliver services for them and onto the “work” 
of delivering services themselves – enabled by international technical assistance.
To be irreversible, transition also needs long -term commitment. nATO’s long-
-term commitment was formalized through the enduring Partnership signed at the 
Lisbon Summit. The story of Lisbon was therefore the commitment beyond 2014 to 
underwrite what the Afghan defence Minister, General Wardak, calls Afghanistan’s 
“journey to self -reliance”, through long -term training, technical assistance and 
funding for both civil governance and security forces. Once mature, the Afghan 
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security forces’ recurrent costs will be US$ 6 -8 billion a year. The Afghans won’t 
be able to fund that themselves until the mid -2020s even as their mineral resources 
come on stream. Afghanistan will likely still be among the world’s poorest countries, 
therefore it is understood that the international community will have to stay inves-
ted for a decade or more.
Other bilateral agreements too will follow, notably the US -Afghanistan Strategic 
Partnership.
Reconciliation and Regional Stability
The international community’s long -term commitment to underwrite an Afgha-
nistan able to secure and govern itself is a strategic political fact which some within 
Afghanistan and across the region have yet to appreciate. One of the Taliban’s best 
sound bites is “While you have the watches, we have the time”. if they still belie-
ve it, they are in for an unpleasant surprise, but they certainly used to have a point. 
With the international coalition endlessly and publicly debating transition – “not 
an exit strategy” – and reconciliation – “not an exit strategy” – not only the Taliban, 
but most Afghans and all their neighbors believed that the international commu-
nity would lose patience and leave an unstable Afghanistan. The consequences of 
this would likely then be handled according to their national, ethnic or factional 
interests. Unsurprisingly, they re -insured against that contingency and in doing so 
made it all the more likely. The Great Game was back on.
However, the transition programme and the enduring partnerships founded on 
a solid platform of operational progress have established a new political landscape. 
Many Afghans and their neighbors are beginning to recognize this, although there 
are, inevitably, forces of reaction who haven’t or won’t. To overcome them, their 
perspectives on their strategic interests must be understood. For example: the in-
ternational community’s strategic interest in Afghanistan is focused on the threat 
of al -Qaeda and their allies, for which an Afghanistan able to secure and govern 
itself is necessary. The Afghan strategic interest is the mirror image: an Afghanistan 
able to secure and govern itself, for which they need to tackle the threat of al -Qaeda 
and their allies. interests are aligned but they are not the same.
Similarly, Afghanistan’s neighbors have their own view of their strategic interests. 
Pakistan’s national security policy remains centered on india and they see Afgha-
nistan through that prism. While they recognize the threat of a Talibanized Afgha-
nistan, the Pakistani Army is naturally preoccupied with militancy threatening them 
now from the tribal areas along the Afghan border. For the first time they are fighting 
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hard to bring this under control. They are also having to re -examine the relationships 
between various militant groups – whether Pashtun, Punjabi or Kashmiri – which 
have burgeoned in the past two decades. Unregulated madrassas fuel the spread of 
this militancy, which successive governments have struggled to rein in. in the wi-
der politics of Pakistan, anti -Americanism is never far below the surface...Some 
commentators in Pakistan even argue that the US presence in the region is aimed 
at their nuclear programme. no wonder the West and Pakistan sometimes talk past 
each other.
Likewise, in iran, the military/security establishment fears encirclement by 
nATO or US forces to their north (Turkey), south (the Gulf), west (iraq) and east 
(Afghanistan). While the international community might dismiss these fears, it must 
accept that, in a region plagued by insecurity and factional politics, they are since-
re. And those fears lead some to the conclusion that an unstable Afghanistan is 
preferable to an unfriendly Afghanistan.
So, one of the most urgent tasks for those engaged in implementing Secretary 
clinton’s diplomatic surge [announced at a speech at the Asia Society in new York 
in early 2011] is to ensure that all the players understand the new landscape and 
recalibrate their own view of their strategic interests. This will require intense but 
calm and patient diplomacy. in that context, the expansion of Richard Holbrooke’s 
brainchild – the international contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan – was 
one of the most significant diplomatic initiatives of the past couple of years. The 
international contact Group now includes several important Muslim nations (some 
of which are considering becoming iSAF contributors) and the addition of the 
Organization of the islamic conference – the Oic – to the international institutional 
framework. The Oic appointed their first ambassador to Afghanistan and its in-
volvement demonstrates the truly international nature of the campaign against 
militancy which respects neither religion nor borders. it also provides a Muslim 
political environment in which the Afghan side is comfortable.
What does all this mean for a political strategy: reconciliation with the core 
Taliban? Four parameters – operational progress as the platform for sustainable 
transition, progress underwritten by enduring partnerships, acceptance throughout 
the region and acceptance throughout the Muslim world – frame a sustainable 
Afghan reconciliation process rather than an ephemeral political deal. While the 
international community can help set the conditions, that process must be Afghan-
-to -Afghan. And on that, the news is positive.
To President Karzai’s credit, the most important political development was the 
Peace Jirga and subsequent High Peace council. The Jirga confounded those who 
feared a populist backlash against international forces or a chaotic non -event.
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instead, the President and his team choreographed a national consensus which 
distinguished between irreconcilable militants and “disaffected compatriots” pre-
pared to renounce violence and terrorism, and respect the constitution.
in a charged ethnic atmosphere, reconciling the Taliban could be seen by other 
ethnic groups as reuniting the Pashtuns at their expense. So locking in the Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, Hazaras and civil society, all of whom fear that reconciliation could be ini-
mical to their interests, was a substantial political achievement.
Arguably more important than insurgent reintegration, in a communal but 
fragmented political culture, will be the work of the provincial peace councils in 
grass -roots conflict resolution. While we all refer to “the insurgency” or “the Tali-
ban” as cohesive political movements, in actuality a kaleidoscope of local insurgencies 
are exploited and unified by an opportunistic Taliban leadership from the comfort of 
their sanctuaries in Pakistan or by criminal warlords. 90 percent of the insurgents 
fight within 10 kilometers of their homes. As the story of Marjah illustrated, most 
are not hard -line ideologues but “disaffected compatriots” who drift into fighting 
with the Taliban because of local grievances – predatory governance, tribal or ethnic 
exclusion from political and economic power, frictions over land, water and so on 
– or to exercise criminal control over the drugs and extortion rackets. While the in-
surgency won’t be brought to an end without tackling the source, much of the fuel 
can be taken out of it through delivering sustainable security and decent rule of law 
on the ground, and by resolving local conflicts and disputes. Provincial governors 
and provincial peace councils will be central to this and will need professional assis-
tance, whether through the Un’s Salaam Support Group or some other mechanism.
As for the Taliban leadership, despite much speculation, they still show little 
interest in a genuine reconciliation process. Within their own world view, they act 
rationally. To appeal to their core Pashtun constituencies in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, they claim to be “the people’s mujaheddin” fighting a foreign occupa-
tion and they disavow the indiscriminate violence they inflict on their own people. 
But it is clear that their motive is power: the power to turn the clock back to the 
medieval barbarity of the 1990s regime, a regime they impose wherever they have 
the opportunity. While there are distinctions between the Afghan and Pakistani 
Taliban movements, their core objective is both ideological and nationalist: a Tali-
banized Pashtunistan bracketing the durand Line as the first step to an islamic 
emirate in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. extraordinary though that sounds, it is 
about power. And that means there should be scope for dialogue. it is also why 
that dialogue must be Afghan -led.
As the Brahimi -Pickering Report for the next century Foundation pointed out, 
it has not been clear hitherto with whom the Afghans should negotiate or about 
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what. The headline recommendation – appointing an international reconciliation 
facilitator – somewhat overshadowed the most promising ideas in the Report. One 
such idea was how an inclusive political settlement – rebalancing power and re-
sources between the executive and legislature, the centre and provinces, within 
Afghanistan’s unitary state – could meet the strategic interests and mitigate the 
strategic risks for all the key players, internal and regional.
This is a powerful concept and whether it is pursued by a single facilitator or 
several, it is worth exploring. indeed, as we have learnt in other conflicts, the 
process can be part of the solution. Whether that includes direct talks with the 
Taliban leadership, events will determine. But, if the Foundation’s idea gains 
momentum, the Taliban leaders might find that everyone on whom they depend 
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has found an alternative means of securing 
their interests.
Time for Diplomacy
Those who have been arguing for years for a political surge and a reconciliation 
process will doubtless wonder whether the rest are slow learners. As Talleyrand 
famously observed, diplomacy is about timing. The time is now right to take the 
risk and pursue the political agenda with the same energy brought to the military 
and civilian surges. in March 2010, the more excitable talk about reconciliation and 
transition risked signaling a scramble for the exit and thus reducing the prospects 
for a stable political settlement.
2010 was spent working quietly with others to put in place the political and 
diplomatic framework to exploit the operational progress that the surge had deli-
vered under the outstanding leadership of General Mcchrystal, and subsequently 
General Petraeus.
Progress is fragile and reversible, but the initiative has been regained against 
the insurgency, and confidence and cohesion restored to the international coalition. 
2011 is the year, as transition begins, to consolidate those gains – hard -won by the 
courage of international and Afghan forces. The risks and inevitable setbacks must 
be managed, and improvements made to the resilience of governance against the 
internal threat of warlordism and the external challenge from the insurgency. This 
will consolidate the confidence of the Afghan people in the Afghan state.
Progress, transition, partnership and regional stability should set the platform 
for a sustainable Afghan reconciliation process and a durable internal political 
settlement. That settlement will be complex, reflecting the fragmented politics of 
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Afghanistan, and much of it will be local. Whether it leads to a “peace deal” with 
the Taliban leadership depends on them. The task is to ensure that Afghanistan can 
secure and govern itself irrespective of what they decide, and that means helping 
the Afghans work towards an inclusive political settlement of the kind described 
in the Brahimi -Pickering Report.
This will require political and diplomatic action at every level from the Afghan 
village to the Un Security council, because a stable reconciliation settlement within 
Afghanistan depends on a stable regional settlement with Afghanistan, and vice 
versa. That has been the diplomatic agenda for 2011 and every opportunity must 
be taken. The April nATO/iSAF Foreign Ministers’ meeting, June’s defence Mi-
nisterial, the international contact Group, the istanbul regional summit in the 
autumn, Bonn ii in december and the meeting of nATO/iSAF Heads of State and 
Government at the Summit in the US in 2012 – all are stepping stones to move the 
process forward.
There will be setbacks. Political processes are frustrating. There are forces of 
reaction that are itching to fire the starting gun on Great Game 3.0, and the insurgents 
will try to exploit this. everyone will have to swallow difficult compromises. in-
surgent warlords with the blood of our troops on their hands will have to be ac-
cepted within Afghan political life. So will Afghanistan’s other ethnic communities 
who suffered so many atrocities under Taliban rule. Those in power will have to 
share it. The Taliban will have to accept that their dream of turning the clock back 
to their repressive islamic emirate is over, and re -enter normal Afghan life with all 
the drudgery of the second -poorest country in the world. Afghanistan’s neighbors 
must accept that the Great Game is over: Afghanistan is no longer the turf on whi-
ch their regional rivalries can be played out. And the international community must 
accept the burden of underwriting the Afghan political settlement if another spiral 
back into disaffection, factionalism, civil war and state failure is to be avoided. This 
will undoubtedly be a challenge. But it is a challenge we can meet.
Conclusion
in April 2009, security, governance, regional relations and coalition cohesion 
were in poor shape. By 2010, the initiative against the insurgency had been regained 
and confidence restored to the international coalition. That continued in 2011 as 
the military campaign gathered pace and transition began. But to achieve our stra-
tegic goals, that fragile but substantial operational progress must be turned into 
sustained political progress.
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This will prove as complex as the military and civilian campaigns. Turning 
points are rarely apparent at the time, however inevitable they seem to historians. 
it is unknown whether the turning point in Afghanistan has passed, but the progress 
made in 2010 into 2011 has provided the opportunity to see this effort through to 
a successful conclusion. While there will still be a long hard road ahead, by remai-
ning resolute, that road will lead to the stable Afghanistan and safer world for 
which so many have sacrificed so much. And to bring what General Petraeus has 
called “the longest campaign in the long war” to a successful conclusion, it is time 
for the diplomats to deliver too.
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